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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State appeals following the district court's order granting Brian Neal's motion 
to suppress wherein the district court held that Officer Yount unlawfully extend the 
scope and duration of his stop of Mr. Neal's vehicle and there were "insufficient facts to 
support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity." For the reasons set forth herein, the 
State has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that Officer Yount 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention of Mr. Neal longer than 
necessary to effectuate the stop without his consent, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 24, 2014, at around midnight, Officer Ken Yount had initiated a traffic 
stop on a vehicle, and as he completed the engagement, he observed an unoccupied 
black Pontiac Bonneville and its "windows appeared to be very dark." (Prelim. Tr., p.6, 
L.19 - p.7, L.13.) 1 Officer Yount drove down the street from the Pontiac to conduct 
stationary patrol. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.16-21.) Approximately 40 minutes later, Officer 
Yount observed the Pontiac and began tailing the vehicle. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.8, 
L.4.) After the vehicle failed to signal as it merged onto westbound U.S. 12, Officer 
Yount continued to follow it, waiting to find a better location to initiate a traffic stop. 
1 There are two separate transcripts in the appellate record. For ease of reference, the 
transcript of the 5/14/14 preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim. Tr." while the 
transcript containing the 10/31 /14 suppression hearing and the 12/3/14 motion to 
reconsider hearing is cited herein as "Tr." 
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(Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19.) Soon thereafter, Officer Yount stopped the vehicle in the 
parking lot of a Jack in the Box fast food eatery. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.11-19.) 
Upon approaching the vehicle, within two minutes of the stop, Officer Yount 
requested and obtained Mr. Neal's driver's license and proof of insurance.2 (See Video 
at 12:41:29 - 12:43:30.) Then, a little over two minutes into the stop, Officer Yount 
inquired as to why Mr. Neal was in Lewiston, why he was sweating, and why he seemed 
anxious. (R., pp.172-173.) Next, the following colloquy occurred: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
OK. How come you're so anxious here? 
I don't know. You [inaudible] get pulled over, it's like, you know. 
OK. 
Makes you seem anxious 
You do seem anxious to me. All the property in the car belongs to 
you? 
Everything. 
Any weapons or firearms in the car? 
Absolutely not. 
OK. What's on your shirt there? 
Space Needle. 
OK. Looks like a marijuana leaf there. 
Something like that. 
Yeah. Do you promote marijuana? 
No, I don't promote it. I don't think that it should be illegal, but I 
don't take it. I don't partake. I don't care either way. It doesn't 
matter to me. I like Seattle. I lived there for like 16 years. 
OK. Is there any marijuana in the car? 
2 The insurance card Mr. Neal had provided was expired. 
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Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount: 
Neal 
Yount: 
Neal: 
Yount 
Absolutely not. 
OK. And you didn't have that more current insurance card? 
No, it's in the mail probably. I'm up to date. 
OK. You still seem to be sweating there in the face. 
Yeah, I know it's cause I'm hot. I got my hat on. Take my hat off. 
It's pretty cool out here. 
I know it feels good out there. 
So you're saying that there's noth ... 
[Inaudible]. 
You're saying there's nothing illegal in the car at all? 
No there's nothing illegal in the car. 
And your anxiety is because you got ... 
Yeah. I do take anxiety meds. 
When we finish up here will you let me search your car? 
No, no, no I don't really want you to search my car. 
OK. Well, I think, you know, based on how you're acting I think 
there's something in the car you shouldn't have. Is there any reason 
a narcotics k9 will alert to anything? 
No. No. 
OK. Well I'm gonna go request one come out here. 
Alright. 
OK. Any paraphernalia or anything? 
Nope. 
OK. Now you're starting to breathe heavier. 
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Neal: 
Yount: 
Sir, you're giving me the third degree. I don't have nothing wrong 
with me. 
I'm just asking you simple questions, and you're beginning to 
sweat more from your face. 
(R., pp.13-15; Video at 12:44:20-12:48:58.) 
Officer Yount then ordered Mr. Neal out of the vehicle and made him stand in 
front of his police cruiser. (Video at 12:47:30.) Officer Yount called Mr. Neal's 
information into dispatch and requested backup. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.9-24.) Officer 
Yount also requested a K-9 police unit, but, at about 15 minutes into the stop, learned 
that the K-9 officer was off duty and had been sleeping and would need some additional 
time prior to arrival. (Video at 12:53:40 - 12:55:10.) When the K-9 officer asked how 
long Officer Yount had been on the stop, Officer Yount was less than honest, stating, 
"about 5 now." (Video at 12:54:53.) Officer Yount then spent a significant amount of 
time attempting to determine whether Mr. Neal's probation out of the state of 
Washington would give him the ability to search Mr. Neal's vehicle. (Video at 12:47:32 
- 1 :02:30.) The K-9 unit arrived on the scene at 1 :07 a.m., approximately 26 minutes 
after the vehicle had been stopped. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.1-3.) Officer Yount then tested 
3 As to this comment by Officer Yount, the district court noted, 
On the video, Trooper Yount repeatedly asks Neal if he has illegal drugs, 
firearms, or other weapons in the vehicle and repeatedly asks why he is 
nervous and sweating. When Neal continuously explains he has an 
anxiety disorder and is nervous because of the trooper's questions, Yount 
tells Neal he is just asking him simple questions. The Court finds Yount's 
response disingenuous. While such questions may be routine for Trooper 
Yount, to a motorist stopped for a very minor infraction, the repeated 
questions are understandably perceived, coming from someone in a 
position of authority, as accusatory and totally unrelated to the reason for 
the stop. 
(R., p.199.) 
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the tint of the windows, which took which took a little over one minute to complete. 
(Video 1:09:25- 1:10:32.) At 1.11:53, the K-9 unit was deployed on the vehicle and the 
canine purportedly alerted. (Video 1 :11 53 - 1.15:00.) It is unclear if any of the actual 
citations were prepared during the actual stop or until after Mr. Neal's arrest. 
(R., p.211.) 
Officers then searched the vehicle and Mr. Neal was arrested for possession of 
drug paraphernalia. (R., p.194.) A subsequent search at the Nez Perce County jail 
uncovered a sock in Mr. Neal's underwear containing "a plastic baggy with a black tar-
like substance believed to be heroin, a second plastic baggie that contained a large 
piece of crystal substance believed to be methamphetamine, and a third plastic baggy 
with four yellow pills later identified as hydrocodone." (R., p.194.) 
Mr. Neal was charged by Information with trafficking in heroin and possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.94-95, 115-116.) Defense counsel 
for Mr. Neal filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum, arguing that: ( 1) 
Officer Yount did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Mr. Neal after his 
initial investigation into the traffic citations; (2) Officer Yount did not possess any 
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to prolong Mr. Neal's detention to wait for a drug 
detection dog; and (3) Officer Yount violated Mr. Neal's Fourth Amendment rights by 
unlawfully prolonging the detention. (R., pp 117-119, 127-148.) 
The district court agreed, first finding it "troubling that Trooper Yount's actions at 
the time of the stop are inconsistent with his articulated suspicion and that a review of 
the video belies the trooper's description of Neal's physical appearance and behavior." 
(R., pp.198-199.) Rather, the district court found that "[o]n the video, Neal exhibits no 
jittery behavior and is instead seen standing quite still for a significant period of time." 
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(R., p.199.) Next, the district court observes that "Trooper Yount testified he suspected 
Neal was driving under the influence of drugs, yet he took no investigative action to 
confirm or dispel his suspicion" until after Mr. Neal was arrested. (R., p.199.) The 
district court concluded that 'Trooper Yount requested an off-duty K-9 unit respond on 
what can only be characterized as hunch or speculation in order to provide some basis 
to perform a warrantless and presumptively unreasonable search." (R., p.199.) Based 
upon its view of the facts presented and Officer Yount's credibility, the district court held 
that "there were insufficient facts to support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity" and 
"Trooper Yount unlawfully extended the stop to buy time for a narcotics dog to arrive in 
hopes of confirming a speculative hunch that Neal possessed drugs." (R., p.200.) As a 
result, the district court granted Mr. Neal's motion to suppress. (R., p.201.) 
The State filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.221-223.) 
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that Officer Yount 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention longer than necessary to 
effectuate the stop without Mr. Neal's consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That Officer 
Yount Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer Than Necessary 
To Effectuate The Stop Without Mr. Neal's Consent, In Violation Of The Fourth 
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho 
Constitution 
A Introduction 
After Mr. Neal was stopped for a rather innocuous lane change violation and 
suspicion that the tinting on the windows of his vehicle was too dark, Officer Yount 
interrogated Mr. Neal in an attempt to search Mr. Neal's vehicle. After Mr. Neal refused 
to consent to a search of his vehicle, Officer Yount then spent a significant amount of 
time investigating whether he could use Mr. Neal's probation in Washington to 
circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
Again failing, Officer Yount delayed his official duties to wait for the arrival of a 
K-9 unit to conduct a sniff on the vehicle. In granting the motion to suppress and finding 
that "Officer Yount extended the stop to buy time for a narcotics dog to arrive in hopes 
of confirming a speculative hunch that Neal possessed drugs[,]" the district court openly 
questioned the Officer Yount's veracity and condemned his treatment of Mr. Neal during 
the extended stop. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). "The Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact if 
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supported by substantial evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The 
Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion, it is more than a scintilla, but less than a 
preponderance."' Id. (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478 (1993)). "At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." 
State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct App. 2014). The Court exercises free review of 
"the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." State v. 
Danney, 153 Idaho 408 (2012). "Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an 
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." State v. Russo, 
157 Idaho 299, 307 (2014) (quoting Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Mussell, 139 
Idaho 28, 33 (2003)). 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995). However, the state may rebut this presumption 
by establishing that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. 
Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290. If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search 
must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963). 
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C. The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended While Officer Yount 
Waited For The Drug Detection Dog To Arrive To Accommodate His Hunch 
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for 
a brief, investigatory detention if the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws, or that the vehicle or 
occupant has been, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (citations omitted); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 
(Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 (Ct App. 1999) 
(citations omitted). 'The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable 
cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal 
security of the suspect" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative 
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the 
least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a 
short period of time." Id. (citations omitted). "It is the State's burden to demonstrate 
that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently 
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court unequivocally has asserted that, "reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of 
questioning limited to the purpose of the stop." Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis 
added). It is well established that an investigative detention "must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and a citizen 
"may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing 
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so." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-52 (citing Royer, 460 US. at 498, 500). Furthermore, 
although the stop of the vehicle may be of short duration, if the continued detention of 
the driver unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the purpose of the 
stop, the continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to support 
such inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 652 (citing United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995)); United States v. 
Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001 )). 
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court reiterated, in the context of the 
stop resulting in a dog sniff, "[t]he critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff 
occurs before the officer issues a ticket .. but whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs'-
i.e., adds time to-'the stop[.]"' Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616 
(2015); see also State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The [Supreme] 
Court emphasized that the stop was not lengthened by the use of the dog") (discussing 
the decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). In Rodriguez, the United 
States Supreme Court explained: "Like a Terry stop,[4) the tolerable duration of police 
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'-to address 
the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). The Court reiterated that "[b]ecause addressing the 
infraction is the purpose of the stop, [the detention] may 'last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 
tied to the infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The Court recognized that an officer "may conduct certain unrelated 
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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checks during an otherwise lawful stop. But .. he may not do so in a way that 
prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify 
detaining an individuaL Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In Rodriguez, "[t]he Government argue[d] that an officer may 'incremental[ly]' 
prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in 
pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop 
remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar 
circumstances" Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616. However, the Supreme Court rejected 
that argument: 
The Government's argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-
related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an 
unrelated criminal investigation. The reasonableness of a seizure, 
however, depends on what the police in fact do. . . . If an officer can 
complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of 
"time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission." As we said in 
Cabal/es and reiterate today, a traffic stop "prolonged beyond" that point is 
"unlawful." The critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs 
before the officer issues a ticket, ... but whether conducting the sniff 
"prolongs"-i.e., adds time to-"the stop[.]" 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
On appeal, the State reargues the facts presented to the district court to this 
Court, now seeking the opposite result. However, the district court's legal conclusion 
was based in large part on its view of Officer Yount's veracity and ulterior motive to 
search Mr. Neal's vehicle rather than complete his constitutionally permissible duties as 
a state trooper with the Idaho State Police. In fact, the district court described Officer 
Yount's statement that he was just asking simple questions as "disingenuous," found it 
"troubling" that Officer Yount's actions at the time of the stop were inconsistent with "his 
articulated suspicion," and most importantly, that the Court's "review of the video belies 
the trooper's description of Neal's physical appearance and behavior." (R., pp.198-
12 
200.) Thus, the district court's legal conclusion, that Officer Yount's extended detention 
was not supported by sufficient facts "to support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity" 
is based upon its view of Officer Yount's credibility and assessment of factual inferences 
in the case, all of which is vested in the trial court. Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570 ("At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."). 5 
The State also argues that the district court failed to consider that Officer Yount 
became aware Mr. Neal was on probation in Washington and "[a] restriction on travel 
outside of the jurisdiction of probation is a common condition of probation." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) The State also writes, "And not only was a geographic 
restriction in fact a condition of Neal's probation, based on that condition, it appears that 
Neal was violating his probation by being in the state of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Thus, based on not one, but two assumptions, the State argues, "That Sergeant Yount 
had encountered Neal outside of the jurisdiction of his probation objectively provided the 
officer with 'the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 
individual,' allowing the officer to expand his investigation into potential probation 
violations." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Aside from the fact that the State is asking this Court to find an officer's unknown 
hunches amounts to reasonable suspicion, contrary to established precedent, the State 
5 While the State does appear to argue that the district court's factual finding that the 
video did not support Officer Yount's description of Mr. Neal's physical appearance and 
behavior based upon its own view of the video, without the benefit of viewing Officer 
Yount's in court testimony, the State fails to cite to authority for its proposition. As such, 
by foregoing its opportunity to present argument or authority as to the merits of its claim, 
the State has waived any objection that it may have had to the merits its claim of a 
clearly erroneous factual finding by the district court, although ultimately meritless. See 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking .... ") 
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cites to no authority for its assumption that Officer Yount would have any authority, 
much less jurisdiction, to enforce the terms of Mr. Neal's Washington probation. See 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking ... ") In addition, the State has not offered any 
evidence that Mr. Neal failed to get permission from his probation officer to travel 
outside of the state of Washington, if that is in fact required by his probation agreement. 
Even more troubling, in an attempt to manufacture a reason to search Mr. Neal's 
vehicle, Officer Yount devotes a large portion of his time to investigating the terms of 
Mr. Neal's probation, when he could have been completing Mr. Neal's citations6 or 
measuring the vehicle's window tint. 
Accordingly, in light of the reasons set forth in the district court's order granting 
Mr. Neal's and as argued herein, the State has failed to show error in the district court's 
order granting Mr. Neal's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Neal respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
granting Mr. Neal's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015. 
6 Officer Yount testified that it takes four or five minutes to write a citation for no 
insurance. (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-18.) 
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